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In "The Unmaking of Dona Violeta" (The Nation, 02/26/90), Tony Jenkins outlines several factors
that have undermined the Nicaraguan political opposition's chances for defeating the Sandinista
National Liberation Front at the polls. These factors are summarized below. DISUNITY. There are
now 21 legal parties in Nicaragua, plus a few more attempting to obtain sufficient signatures for
registration. Jenkins mentions that the right in Nicaragua does "what the left does everywhere
else: divide and fragment until being reduced to a myriad of tiny factions busily trading insults." *
Until March 1979, the Conservatives were united in the National Conservative Alliance. At present,
there are five different Conservative parties. Almost every splinter has occurred in the midst of
vitriolic personal insults and litigation to determine who will control the party assets and retain the
party name. Some of these factions are now supposed to be allies within the UNO. * The Liberals
have split four ways, as have the Social Christians. The Social Democrats have split once. There
are two communist parties, two Trotskyist parties, a leftist group that cannot be labeled, and a
center-left party dedicated to Central American union. * UNO was patched together with money
and pressure from the US Embassy. The largest party that was to have joined UNO, the Social
Christian Party led by Erick Ramirez, withdrew for political reasons, and following allegations
of misuse of party funds. The center-left Popular Social Christian Party also pulled out of UNO,
result of disagreement with UNO leaders' plans for dividing power and campaign strategies. The
withdrawal occurred amid rumors that party members were planning to sue their leader, Mauricio
Diaz, for misappropriating donations. Under US pressure, UNO leaders agreed to permit two
communist parties to join the alliance, which upset the most conservative members of the coalition.
The two communist groups hoped that an UNO win would provide them with cabinet posts with
the power of political patronage. Otherwise, they face virtual political extinction. Meanwhile,
some members of the orthodox communist group, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, rebelled, as
one of their leaders, Luis Sanchez, quickly pushed the party to the right and formally renounced
marxism-leninism. Sanchez's father, who founded the party, was so disgusted that he agreed to
stand as a candidate for the FSLN, and other members left the party to join other leftist groups. *
UNO leaders agonized for days over selecting their presidential and vice presidential candidates,
and went through 10 rounds of voting. They bowed to US pressure and chose Violeta Barrios de
Chamorro to head the ticket, and Virgilio Godoy as vice presidential candidate. Godoy, leader of the
Independent Liberal Party (PLI), had been Labor Minister in the first Sandinista administration, and
then split with the FSLN to run for president in 1984. As minister he enforced legislation opposed
by the business community and favored Sandinista unions over locals affiliated with opposition
parties. Four of the UNO coalition parties were apoplectic with his selection, and refused to accept
the nomination. Gilberto Cuadra, head of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP),
was furious, asserting that such a slate could not defeat the Sandinistas. Another chat with US
Embassy officials led the parties to withdraw their objections, and the COSEP leaders became
mute. Godoy himself had strenuously opposed Barrios de Chamorro's nomination, describing her
in an interview with Jenkins as "good for nothing." DONA VIOLETA NO POLITICIAN. Unlike
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other Nicaraguan women involved in politics, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro is not prepared, nor
interested. Instead of addressing problems and issues, she refers constantly to her dead husband
to God to explain her actions. In 1989, Jenkins asked her, "What will you do to revive the economy
if you win?" Her reply: "God will guide my conscience." Dona Violeta was not trusted enough
by her handlers to appear on national television to debate opponents face to face. In addition,
she suffers from osteoarthritis. Both problems have forced her to limit campaign appearances.
CORRUPTION. The evidence of Godoy's embezzlement of thousands of dollars donated to his
party by the West German Friedrich Naumann Foundation was apparently so convincing that
only one member of the 96-member National Assembly voted against a motion to withdraw his
parliamentary immunity from prosecution. * Many Nicaraguans wonder what has happened to
the US funds being channeled through the National Endowment for Democracy. According to a
study by former CIA analyst David MacMichael, the US has channeled some $26 million to the
domestic opposition since 1984. Congress has appropriated $9 million to support the opposition.
Many UNO candidates for municipal and National Assembly elections have withdrawn from the
race, or are complaining about lack of funds. Some have said UNO leaders are using the money for
their own personal pleasure. CLOSE LINKS WITH CONTRAS, SOMOZA'S NATIONAL GUARD.
Among the key figures in UNO are Alfonso Robelo and Alfredo Cesar, both former members of the
contra political directorate. Several UNO candidates in municipal elections are former members of
Somoza's National Guard. TEPID OR NON-EXISTENT NATIONALISM. Following the US invasion
of Panama, the overwhelming response from Latin America was negative. UNO was slow to react
and generally incoherent, ending up with a muted endorsement of the invasion. Next, UNO never
issued a strong condemnation of the US raid on the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Panama,
which enraged Nicaraguans of all political inclinations. ABSENCE OF CREDIBLE ECONOMIC
PROGRAM. UNO's program is vague. Many Nicaraguans are concerned that if the UNO wins, the
old elite will roll back Sandinista efforts at reducing the gap between the rich and the poor. UNO
pledges to raise salaries, spend more on welfare and health, compensate farmers, revitalize the
economy, reduce the foreign debt, but it provides no specific figures, nor step-by-step programme.
It is assumed that Washington would reward UNO for winning with aid. COMPETITION. UNO
is hardly the only "credible" alternative to the FSLN. Jenkins points out that while "UNO leaders
were living the high life in Costa Rica or Miami, or looking for support in Europe and Washington,"
the Conservative Democratic Party of Nicaragua (PCDN) opened up party offices and recruited
new members. The PCDN won 14% of the vote in the 1984 elections. Another serious contender
for the opposition vote is Erick Ramirez's Social Christian Party, in alliance with the Popular Social
Christian Party.
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